Many of the contemporary global challenges we face involve economics, and theologians serving the contemporary church cannot escape an engagement with economics. This paper explores the place of future hope in economics through an examination of Adam Smith's treatment of the topic. It begins by outlining the 18th century theological background of Smith's work, including Stoicism, the Newtonian tradition of natural theology, and the Calvinism of the Scottish Enlightenment moderates. It argues that the future hope plays an important (and neglected) role in Smith's system. Future rewards and punishments are never invoked in utilitarian manner, instead judgment and future life operates as a court of appeal where wrongs on this world are righted. The justice of this divine court of appeal is continuous with and reinforces the natural sense of justice we have in this present life. There can be no conflict between the two because, as Smith affirms, the same 'great Director of nature' is at work in both. For Smith the future state also operates as imaginative space where morality can be considered and renegotiated.
Introduction
A deficit of hope and intractable economic difficulties are common threads in some of our most challenging contemporary problems. Climate change is an example where the science is complex but the economics seems even more so, as demonstrated by the failure to secure global agreement over an emissions trading scheme at the recent Copenhagen summit. Another example is continuing poverty in Africa despite huge investments of aid by Western governments and NGOs.
1 This continuing tragedy strikes deeply at our hope for a world where basic needs of all are met, and the economics of development in Africa perplexes even those who have spent a lifetime grappling with the issues.
This essay makes no pretense of offering solutions to such problems. Its aim is more modest -to explore the place of future hope in economics through an examination of Adam Smith's treatment of the topic. Adam Smith remains important to economists even as the history of economics has moved out of the professional mainstream, so a discussion of hope in Smith provides a bridge for economists to re-engage with theological issues.
Adam Smith as Theologian
Before examining Adam Smith's views on the future hope, we need first to establish that there is theology in Smith worth discussing, and secondly to clarify the broad shape of that theology. I will argue, building on recent work 2 that there are important and under-recognised theological elements in Smith's system which encompasses history, jurisprudence, moral philosophy, and economics. There must be a presumption of an important theological background to any work of moral philosophy or political economy produced in 18 th century Scotland. Examining biographical and textual evidence, as well as the reactions of early readers of Smith's work confirms this presumption.
Smith was born in Kirkaldy in 1723, brought up by his devout Presbyterian mother after the death of his father, and like most of his contemporaries attended church regularly throughout his life. 'Every part of nature, when attentively surveyed, equally demonstrates the providential care of its Author, and we admire the wisdom and goodness of God even in the weakness and folly of man' 6 Or 'the happiness of mankind, as well as all other rational creatures, seems to have been the original purpose intended by the author of nature, when he brought them into existence. ... By acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means 3 for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence '. 7 Or:
'The idea of that divine Being, whose benevolence and wisdom have, from all eternity, contrived and conducted the immense machine of the universe, so as at all times to produce the greatest possible quantity of happiness, is certainly of all the objects of human contemplation by far the most sublime.'
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In relation to morality:
'the governing principles of human nature, the rules which they prescribe are to be regarded as the commands and laws of the Deity'. made early theoretical contributions to economics and was one of the most influential 19th-century writers on the subject, also took Smith to be suggesting that the transformation of selfinterested behaviour into the greatest economic good is providential, writing: 'such a result which at the same time not a single agent in this vast and complicated system of trade contemplates or cares for, each caring only for himself -strongly bespeaks a higher Agent, by whose transcendental wisdom it is, that all is made to conspire so harmoniously, and to terminate so beneficially'. 11 Furthermore 'The whole science of political economy is full of these exquisite adaptions to the wants and comforts of human life, which bespeak the skill of a master-hand, in the adjustment of its laws, and the working of its profoundly constructed mechanism'. The Calvinist background to the theological language Adam Smith's works has been neglected, Smith takes up this Calvinist theme of the Fall, writing of 'irregularity in the human breast' just before the previously cited passage about how 'we may admire the wisdom and goodness of God even in the weakness and folly of man'. 30 Elsewhere the vices and follies of mankind are seen as a necessary part of the plan of the universe. 31 Ignorance of 'all the connexions and dependencies of things' conditions human action, though we can be comforted by the thought that the 'benevolent and all-wise Being can admit into the system of his government, no partial evil which is not necessary for the universal good'.
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Another Calvinist theme which Smith takes up is the need for rigorous self-scrutiny. Following from our limited knowledge and our capacity for self-deception is a need to scrutinise carefully our behaviour, and to supplement our observational and reflective capabilities with the observations and reflections of others in our community. Ian Simpson Ross has suggested this Calvinist theme is behind Smith's spectator mechanisms of moral judgement, one of his major philosophical contributions.
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The most relevant part of the Westminster Confession for this essay is the final chapter Of the Last Judgment which states: 'God has appointed a day, wherein He will judge the world, in righteousness, by Jesus Christ, to whom all power and judgment is given of the Father... The end of God's appointing this day is for the manifestation of the glory of His mercy, in the eternal salvation of the elect; and of His justice, in the damnation of the reprobate, who are wicked and disobedient. For then shall the righteous go into everlasting life, and receive that fullness of joy and refreshing, which shall come from the presence of the Lord; but the wicked who know not God, and obey not the Gospel of Jesus Christ, shall be cast into eternal torments, and be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of His power.' A 35 A passage which some see as evidence of Smith straying from orthodoxy is one that he modified through different editions of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. The final version is 'Nature teaches us to hope, and religion, we suppose, authorises us to expect, that it will be punished, even in a life to come ....in every religion, and in every superstition that the world has ever beheld, accordingly, there has been a Tartarus as well as an Elysium; a place provided for the punishment of the wicked, as well as one for the reward of the just' Smith TMS II ii 3 12 p91.
Earlier versions included an exposition of the orthodox Christian doctrine of the atonement. Details of the changes are discussed by the editors Raphael and Macfie in footnotes and their appendix II to the standard OUP edition. It is commonly thought that the changes weaken the passage, but they may also be taken to generalise and naturalise belief in the afterlife, especially as some of the deleted theological material found its way into other passages added by Smith to this final edition. The most likely explanation of the changes remains a desire to avoid unnecessary controversy over the doctrine of the atonement.
If nature teaches largely by analogy then Smith is departing from Hume's position that such analogies are philosophically illegitimate, or at least suggesting that the fact that we learn about the afterlife by analogy is more important than a philosophical argument about the legitimacy of analogy. In keeping the reference to the afterlife fairly general Smith avoids buying into controversies such as mortalism, the dispute between upholders of the traditional view that the soul is immortal, and others such as Hobbes in England and Hume in Scotland, who held that the soul is mortal though God can grant eternal life.
mortality, and maintain its cheerfulness under all the heaviest calamities to which, from the disorders of this life, it may sometimes be exposed. In a similar vein Smith writes: 'When we thus despair of finding any force upon earth which can check the triumph of injustice, we naturally appeal to heaven, and hope, that the great Author of our nature will himself execute hereafter, what all the principles which he has given us for the direction of our conduct, prompt us to attempt even here; that he will complete the plan which he himself has thus taught us to begin; and will, in a life to come, render to every one according to the works which he has performed in this world. And thus we are led to the belief of a future state, not only by the weaknesses, by the hopes and fears of human nature, but by the noblest and best principles which belong to it, by the love of virtue, and by the abhorrence of vice and As he suggests we can even admire divine providence at work as this sense of justice arises within us.
Overall for Smith judgment and future hope operate as a court of appeal where wrongs of this world are righted and persons receive their just deserts. The justice of the divine court of appeal is continuous with and reinforces the natural sense of justice we have in this present life. There is no conflict between the two because for Smith the 'great Director of nature' is providentially at work in both.
The Future Hope as an Imaginative Space
One of the themes of recent Smith scholarship has been the importance of the imagination in Smith's account of scientific progress, and in Smith's spectator mechanisms of morality. 40 For
Smith the future state also operates as an imaginative space where morality can be negotiated under the gaze of the author of nature.
He uses passages about the future state to recommend an active life which bears practical fruit, as against the quiet monkish life recommended by some of his religious contemporaries. The best 12 example is Smith's vigorous objection to the elevation of monkish virtues by Massillon, the French Catholic Bishop of Clermont. Smith writes 'To compare, in this manner, the futile mortifications of a monastery, to the ennobling hardships and hazards of war; to suppose that one day, or one hour, employed in the former should, in the eye of the great Judge of the world, have more merit than a whole life spent honourably in the latter, is surely contrary to all our moral sentiments; to all the principles by which nature has taught us to regulate our contempt or admiration. It is this spirit, however, which, while it has reserved the celestial regions for monks and friars, or for those whose conduct and conversation resembled those of monks and friars, has condemned to the infernal all the heroes, all the statesmen and lawgivers, all the poets and philosophers of former ages; all those who have invented, improved, or excelled in the arts which contribute to the subsistence, to the conveniency, or to the ornament of human life; all the great protectors, instructors, and benefactors of mankind; all those to whom our natural sense of praiseworthiness forces us to ascribe the highest merit and most exalted virtue. Can we wonder that so strange an application of this most respectable doctrine should sometimes have exposed it to contempt and derision; with those at least who had themselves, perhaps, no great taste or turn for the devout and contemplative virtues.'
A further example is the famous passage added to the final edition of the Theory of Moral
Sentiments where Smith writes of the connection between virtue and our sense of the benevolence of God. He writes: 'To this universal benevolence, … the very suspicion of a fatherless world, must be the most melancholy of all reflections; from the thought that all the unknown regions of infinite and incomprehensible space may be filled with nothing but endless misery and wretchedness… All the splendour of the highest prosperity can never enlighten the gloom with which so dreadful an idea must necessarily overshadow the imagination'. 42 I take this to be an eloquent statement of the imaginative power of future hope, and of the destructive effects on the imagination of a Godless and thus hopeless future. In the literature there is some ambiguity over whether teleology means recourse to teleological explanation (in the sense of specifying final causes alongside or instead of efficient causes) or a full blown Aristotelian-Thomist teleological framework for science and ethics. Economists, including historians of economics, tend to use teleological in the first weaker sense. There has not been much recent writing on economics within an Aristotelian-Thomistic teleological framework. Part of the reason for the disagreement in the literature over teleology in Smith is that scholars like Kleer find teleology in the weaker sense while MacIntyre and Taylor are looking for it in the stronger sense.
Examining Smith's writings, it is clear teleology in the weaker sense is present, though final causes are separated carefully from efficient causes. A key passage is: 'In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted with the nicest artifice to the ends which they are intended to produce; and in the mechanism of a plant, or animal body, we admire how everything is contrived for advancing the two great purposes of nature, the support of the individual, and the propagation of the species. But in these, and in all such objects, we still distinguish the efficient from the final cause of their several motions and organizations. The digestion of the food, the circulation of the blood, and the secretion of the several juices which are drawn from it, are operations all of them necessary for the great purposes of animal life. Yet we never endeavour to account for them from those purposes as from their efficient causes, nor imagine that the blood circulates, or that the food digests of its own accord, and with a view or intention to the purposes of circulation or digestion. The wheels of the watch are all admirably adjusted to the end for which it was made, the pointing of the hour. All their various motions conspire in the nicest manner to produce this effect. If they were endowed with a desire and intention to produce it, they could not do it better.
Yet we never ascribe any such desire or intention to them, but to the watch-maker, and we know that they are put into motion by a spring, which intends the effect it produces as little as they do.
But though, in accounting for the operations of bodies, we never fail to distinguish in this manner the efficient from the final cause, in accounting for those of the mind we are very apt to confound these two different things with one another. When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends, which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance 49 
Knud Haakonssen The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith
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those ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of God.
Upon a superficial view, this cause seems sufficient to produce the effects which are ascribed to it; and the system of human nature seems to be more simple and agreeable when all its different operations are in this manner deduced from a single principle.' 50 Smith is here insisting on specifying efficient causes, within a larger framework that leaves space for final causes. The discussion of the watch connects with his later discussion of the economic system in the Wealth of Nations. There the individual economic actors are like parts of the watch, lacking an intention to produce beneficial social ends, an intention which is supplied by the divine designer economic system.
But is there a stronger Aristotelian teleological framework in Smith? Answering this question is complicated by Smith's viscerally negative attitude to the degenerate Aristotelianism of his day, formed especially during his unrewarding years as a Snell scholar at Balliol College Oxford.
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The negative comments about scholastic Aristotelianism littered thorough his works may have helped commentators latch on to Smith as a turning point in the banishment of teleology from science. However it is notable that there is no direct criticism of Aristotle in the discussion of systems of moral philosophy in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Another complication is that for Smith with his Calvinist roots, teleology tends to be expressed in providentialist language.
If Smith is working within such a larger teleological framework, then a telos needs to be identified. Smith is reasonably consistent about this, though also slightly evasive. In the History of Ancient Physics he writes of science progressing to the point where the 'Universe was regarded as a complete machine, as a coherent system, governed by general laws, and directed to general ends, viz. its own preservation and prosperity, and that of all the species that are in it' 52 . In the Theory of Moral Sentiments passage cited above the end is specified as the 'support of the individual and propagation of the species', elsewhere it is 'happiness of mankind' or the 'happiness and perfection of the species'. of Nations the end is given as 'bettering our condition', without any more specific guidance about its content.
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Smith's acknowledgement of the ends of nature and admittedly vague specifications of these ends fits in with an Aristotelian framework, certainly more so than the utilitarian framework which came to dominate economics in the early 19th century. The ends have an earthy flavour which is entirely appropriate for a writer observing the beginning of the industrial revolution and seeing the possibilities for better material provision for his Scottish compatriots -of perhaps burying the English epithet that oats were the food of horses and Scotsmen. However, alongside the emphasis on provision of material goods there are passages about how ultimately unfulfilling wealth is, for instance his famous comparison of the happiness of the beggar beside the road with the rich man, and passages about how the baubles and trinkets of wealth are a divine trick played on human beings to drive the economic system.
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Material wealth, much discussed in the Wealth of Nations, is never specified as an ultimate end. It contributes in a complex and indirect manner to ultimate ends like the 'happiness and perfection of the species'.
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Smith's evasiveness about specifying ends comes I think comes from his Calvinist suspicion of our capacity to know these matters. God works providentially in ways that we cannot fully comprehend, and presumption about these matters is dangerous.
In fact Smith suggests that ultimate ends and connections between our actions and these ultimate ends are opaque to human beings for good reasons, leaving our God-given human nature rather than our rational powers to guide us towards beneficent ends. As he writes: 'Nature has directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate instincts. Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, the love of pleasure, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them.' 
The Future Hope in Contemporary Economics

Contemporary economics is a long way from Adam Smith. Alasdair McIntyre and Charles
Taylor may have erred in placing Smith on the modern side of the line which divides modern from older teleological approaches to scientific explanation and moral philosophy 59 but contemporary economics definitely has no place for teleology.
It is arguable that banishing teleology (together with any meaningful discussion of eschatology) and narrowing the focus has assisted theoretical and empirical advances in economics over the past 150 years. But this narrowing has also hindered the capacity of economists to engage with really important questions that touch our deepest hopes and sense of justice. Proposals from contemporary economists on issues such as climate change and poverty in Africa seem to lack of constitution of our human nature. Human beings are oriented toward ends which we understand only imperfectly.
There is further discussion of Smith's view of divine and human agency, and the doctrine of providence in Oslington 
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answering them. Such a reframing will require more attention to history and philosophy of economics than is usual at the moment in the graduate training of economists, and greater engagement by economists with scholars working in other disciplines, including philosophers and theologians.
Making space for teleology is necessary for a renewed discussion of future hope in contemporary economics. If we are to have this new discussion it is important that Christian hope is specified in a way that is both true to the mainstream theological tradition and meaningful for economists.
Smith was scornful as we have seen of a future hope that is about 'celestial regions for monks and friars', a hope that he felt exposed the doctrine to 'contempt and derision'.
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This essay is not the place to mount a full theological argument about continuity between our present world and the renewed world which we will inhabit with our resurrection bodies. Such an argument turns on the inherent immortality of the soul being an illegitimate Platonic import into the Christian tradition, the Scriptural affirmation of the material world, and emphasis of the scriptural passages about our future on renewal; on the destruction of evil rather than the destruction of the world.
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As well as being arguably more consistent with the Scriptures such an earthy future hope is likely to be far more appealing to economists and policy makers seeking reform. Under such a vision our practical achievements in providing human material needs continue, our efforts to care for the earth through designing appropriate systems of economic incentives for reducing carbon emissions have lasting value, and so forth. A faraway place of clouds and harps tends to operate as a substitute for earthly work to improve our lot (or in Marx's language an opiate of the people) while a more earthy future hope complements and calls forth work for the good of all.
Some economists may not be actively opposed to such discussion within professional forums, but may nevertheless ignore it as pointless theological waffle. 
